Drew Van Kuiken

If benefits to infrastructure vary by firm, shifting infrastructure availability will change the equilibrium level and location of entry. I study this channel in the context of the Texas electric grid, where electric transmission is scarce and renewable resource quality varies by region and technology. I solve a dynamic entry game for renewable generators, capturing spatial and technological entry margins. Embedded within my entry game is a physically realistic model of electricity dispatch, where electricity flows and prices are endogenous. The model is based on a new dataset (2018–2024) with generation, transmission capacity, and demand information. I find that limited transmission capacity and spatially concentrated wind resources suppress wind entry, while solar generators respond to limited transmission capacity by entering less sunny regions with fewer transmission constraints. I explore two counterfactuals—one where entrants pay for grid upgrades, and one where grid operators run a market for new transmission—under fixed demand and data-center-driven demand growth. I find that the market for new transmission generates more welfare than the Texas or entrant-funded upgrade policies, and that both non-market policies yield inefficiently low and spatially distorted entry choices.

We analyze consumer search and purchase behavior in response to airline revenue-management practices using data from a major carrier’s website and Google Flights. We first describe patterns in search timing, purchase decisions, and paid fares. Then we estimate a multinomial logistic regression to identify factors driving search timing, finding that single adults with loyalty status, especially booking one-way nonstop itineraries, tend to search closer to departure. Next, we use a binary logistic model of conversions of searches to sales, showing that competitors' prices and changing customer composition explain rising conversion probabilities as departure nears. Finally, using a fixed-effects regression, we reveal how search and booking patterns affect prices paid. Late-arriving travelers, particularly single adults with loyalty status, pay substantially more, consistent with the airline’s pricing strategies that segment more inelastic customers. Overall, our findings underscore how revenue-management, competitor fares, and consumer characteristics jointly shape online search and purchase behavior.

The airline industry has undergone many changes in the last 30 years and faced substantial scrutiny over performance and pricing. Our analysis combines a variety of data sources to provide a long-term perspective on market structure and its impact on consumer welfare. We begin by documenting trends in prices, network connectivity, consolidation, low-cost competition, passenger values, and measures of service quality. To measure the impact of these factors on consumer welfare, we estimate a structural model of price competition between airlines to recover consumer's preferences over service attributes and identify determinants of airline's costs. We find that consumer welfare has steadily improved over this period with increased low-cost competition and improvements to legacy networks being the primary contributors. We discuss the implications of our results for policy directed at the industry.