Infrastructure as Market Design: Location and Technology Choice on the Electric Grid
When infrastructure shifts equilibrium entry, what infrastructure policy maximizes welfare?
Abstract
I study how infrastructure policy shifts the equilibrium level, location, and technological composition of entry. My setting is the Texas electric grid, where transmission infrastructure is scarce and production varies by location and technology. I solve a dynamic entry game for renewable generators, capturing spatial and technological entry margins. Embedded within my entry game is a novel, physically realistic model of electricity dispatch, where electricity flows and prices are endogenous. The model is estimated using data from 2018-2024 with generation, transmission capacity, and demand information. I compare the entry patterns under three transmission provision policies: a Texas baseline with a fixed grid; a Pigouvian tax, where entrants pay for their own grid upgrades; and a market, where generators and consumers submit bids for grid upgrades. I find that entrants paying for their own upgrades, a common policy throughout the U.S., reduces welfare by $1.2 billion relative to the baseline because entrants choose worse quality locations with lower upgrade burdens. The market for grid upgrades increases welfare by $1.2 billion, as entrants choose higher resource quality locations and congestion decreases on the grid. My results suggest that entry in congested networks is distorted spatially and technologically, but policy that coordinates entry and infrastructure provision can eliminate that distortion.
